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Abstract 
We give a historical overview of the development of almost 50 years of empirical re-
search on the affordances in the past and in the  present. Defined by James Jerome 
Gibson in the early development of the Ecological Approach to Perception and Action 
as the prime of perception and action, affordances have become a rich topic of investi-
gation in the fields of human movement science and experimental psychology. The 
methodological origins of the empirical research performed on affordances can be 
traced back to the mid 1980’s and the works of Warren (1984, 1988) and Michaels 
(1988). Most of the research in Ecological Psychology performed since has focused on 
the actualization of discretely defined actions, the perception of action boundaries, the 
calculation of pi-numbers, and the measurement of response times. The research ef-
forts have resulted in advancements in the understanding of the dynamic nature of 
affordances, affordances in a social context and the importance of calibration for per-
ception of affordances. Although affordances are seen as an instrumental part of the 
control of action most studies investigating affordances do not pay attention to the 
control of the action. We conclude that affordances are still primarily treated as a util-
ity to select behaviour, which creates a conceptual barrier that hinders   deeper un-
derstanding of affordances. A focus on action-boundaries has largely prevented ad-
vancement in other aspects of affordances, most notably an integrative understanding 
of the role of affordances in the control of action.  
Keywords:  Ecological  Psychology;  Action  Selection;  Action  Boundary;  Perception-
Action; Experimental Psychology.  
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James Jerome Gibson stressed that humans and other animals are active perceivers 
that live and move in a meaningful environment. The objects of perception and action, 
therefore,  according  to  Gibson,  are  the  meaningful  relations  between  animals  and 
their environment. Gibson called these relations affordances. He first introduced the 
term in 1966 as “ (…) simply what things furnish, for good or ill” (Gibson 1966: 285) 
and  further  described  the  theory  of  affordances  in  his  later  work  (Gibson  1977, 
1979/1986) where affordances were defined as “a specific combination of the proper-
ties of its substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal”(Gibson 1977: 
67)
2627. The aim of the current review was to give an overview of the development of 
almost 50 years of research on affordances. 
It was not until two important papers by Bill Warren (1984, 1988) were published be-
fore experimental research on affordances could really take off. In these papers War-
ren defined the role of affordances in the guidance of action and argued for the follow-
ing sequence in the unfolding of an action: “…the intentions of the actor select an af-
fordance to be realized, a corresponding mode of action by which to realize it, and 
appropriate laws of control to visually regulate the action” (Warren 1988: 341). More 
specifically, Warren argued that critical points of affordances may induce phase tran-
sitions between different modes of action-- involving stopping the first mode of action 
and starting another one--which are governed by different laws of control. In other 
words, according to Warren action modes map one-to-one into unique sets of control 
laws. Warren proposed that in this process of the action guidancetwo different prob-
lems need to be distinguished: First, the “affordance problem” of how organisms per-
ceive what actions the environment affords in a given situation and on the basis of 
which action modes are selected; and second, the “control problem” of how optical 
variables regulate actions during a specific task. 
 
Measuring Affordances 
Gibson suggested that an affordance has to be measured relatively to the actor (Gibson 
1979/1986: 127-128). That is to say, instead of using arbitrarily extrinsic units (e.g., me-
ters) for environmental properties, affordances should be defined in terms of intrinsic 
metrics  reflecting  the  animal-environment  relation.  Warren  (1984)  operationalized 
this idea in his study on the climbability of stairs. When taking a property of the ani-
mal as a standard for measuring an environmental property that is measured in the 
same arbitrarily extrinsic unit, the ratio of the two metrics is a dimensionless pi num-
ber that reflects the animal-environment relation. For instance, Warren found that 
                                                             
26Since  the  first  introduction,  different  researchers  and  theorists  have  commented  on  and  refined  the 
definition of affordances. For instance, Turvey (1992) defined affordances as dispositional properties of the 
environment that are complemented by dispositional properties of animals, which he coined effectivities; 
Stoffregen  (2003)  argued  that  affordances  should  be  regarded  as  properties  of  the  animal-environment 
system rather than as dispositional properties; Michaels (2003) defined affordances as the actions permitted 
to an animal by environmental objects, events, places, surfaces, people etc.; Chemero (2003) proposed that 
affordances are relations between the abilities of animals and features of the environment. 
27In the remainder of this paper we will focus on affordance research that follows the tradition started by 
Gibson (1979/1986) as the Ecological Approach (cf. Reed 1996). A Remedy called Affordance 
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independent of how tall people are, their action-boundary for the climbability of stairs 
(the critical height of a riser, such that lower risers are climbable whereas higher ris-
ers are not) is at a riser height of .88 times their leg length. Observers were remarka-
bly accurate in the perception of this critical climbable riser height, and also of the 
optimal riser height (the riser height that could be climbed with least energy expendi-
ture, at .26 times leg length).A biomechanical analysis showed that the number of .88 
times leg length was not an arbitrary number: Warren measured the lengths of upper 
and lower legs, and established that upper leg length was .44 times total leg length, on 
average. Given this ratio, the number of .88 times leg length equals the distance from 
the foot to the floor when the upper leg is lifted maximally, touching the trunk. In the 
years following, the paradigm of looking for critical boundaries (and pi numbers) to 
study affordances was extended to a broad variety of tasks. To name a few examples, 
affordance research was performed on sitting (Mark 1987; Mark et al. 1990), passing 
through  apertures  (Warren  &Whang  1987),  passing  under  barriers  (van  der  Meer 
1997; Wagman&Malek 2008, 2009; Stefanucci et al. 2010), reaching (Carello et al. 1989; 
Rochat 1995), stepping over obstacles (Pufall & Dunbar 1992) and gaps(Jiang & Mark 
1994) and walking-up slopes (Kinsella-Shaw et al. 1992).  
 
Towards An Action Scaled Approach To Affordances 
The early work on affordances was focused on, the so-called, body scaled affordances: 
affordances defined in terms of a geometric relation between the actor and the envi-
ronment. However, as later researchers would argue, one's action capabilities are not 
merely body scale dependent, but are rather a combination of geometric, kinematic 
and kinetic characteristics. To address this idea, over the years, researchers have come 
up with experiments following an action scaled approach. For instance, Konzcak et al. 
(1992) reconsidered the situation of climbing stairs by taking into account not only leg 
length but also kinematic and kinetic factors such as hip flexibility and leg strength to 
calculate action boundaries. This action-scaled approach provided a better fit of the 
actual action boundary of maximal riser height than Warren’s body-scaled measure. 
Perceived  maximal  riser  height  corresponded  well  with  achieved  maximal  riser 
height, both in younger and older adults. The older participants were even more accu-
rate  in  perceiving  their action  boundaries  than  the  younger adults.  Konzcak  et  al. 
(1992) argued that the reason could be that older people might have to be more accu-
rate in order to avoid falling, while younger adults have the action capabilities to cor-
rect the results of a miscalculation. 
Another  example  of  an  action-scaled  approach  are  the  studies  of  Pepping  and  Li 
(1997,1999, 2000) investigating the perception of action boundaries in the volleyball 
block. Pepping and Li showed that the action of overhead reaching and blocking in 
volleyball is, as in many sports situations, dependent on both geometric characteristics 
(reach height of the player) as well as kinetic characteristics (jumping ability of the 
player) and that participants accurately perceive their maximum overhead reach and 
block  height.  In  order to  investigate  whether kinetic  variables  could  be  perceived, 
Pepping and Li (1999, 2000) designed a series of experiments in which they either 
changed the action capabilities, by giving the participants’ a weighted belt to wear AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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which added their mass, or altered the kinetic requirements of the task by using dif-
ferent types of floors. The changes resulting in afforded actions led to an adaptation of 
the perceived action boundaries (Pepping and Li 1999, 2000).  
 
Calibration And The Dynamic Nature Of Affordances 
One’s  action  capabilities  can  change  over  time  and  researchers  have  investigated 
whether people’s perception adapts to these changing action capabilities. The process 
of recalibration to changed action capabilities was first shown by Mark (1987), in a 
study on sitting and stairs climbing. The participants of the study were wearing 10 cm 
blocks under their feet while judging their maximum seat height and their maximum 
riser  height.  Participants  initially  overestimated  their  action  capabilities  for  stairs 
climbing and underestimated their action capabilities for sitting, consistent with the 
situation  of  not  wearing  blocks  under  their  feet.  After  some  experience  with  the 
blocks, they were able to recalibrate their perception of the new action boundaries for 
sitting and stair climbing, consistent with the change in their action capabilities: a 
process that could not be explained by a changed perception of the blocks, since par-
ticipants consistently overestimated the height of the blocks.  
As mentioned, Pepping and Li (1999, 2000) found that participants were able to rescale 
their perceived maximal reach when their action capabilities changed. Similar obser-
vations were made in the perception of affordances for standing on an inclined sur-
face  while changing  the  location (Malek&Wagman  2008)  or  the  height (Regia-Corte 
&Wagman  2008) of the centre of mass of participants. When weights were attached to 
their body, participants were able to recalibrate to the changes in action capabilities, 
independently of whether they visually saw the surface or were able to haptically ex-
plore the inclination of the surface. 
 Most  of  the  research  on  changed  action  capabilities  involved  familiar  tasks  for 
healthy adults. In contrast, a number of studies addressed the ability of participants to 
perceive affordances when using a wheelchair. The use of a wheelchair is a task most 
healthy adults are not familiar with (cf. Stoffregen et al. 2009). In a study by Higuchi et 
al.  (2004)  participants  unaccustomed  to  the  task  of  using  a  wheelchair  judged  the 
passability of apertures when rolling in a wheelchair. Systematic overestimation of 
their abilities occurred. After 8 days of practice passing through apertures the estima-
tions improved, but the overestimation of the action capabilities did not completely 
disappear. The practice involved in this study only consisted of the task of passing 
through apertures, the task participants had to judge. Stoffregen et al. (2009) allowed 
some perceivers two minutes of self-controlled wheelchair motion before judging the 
minimum height under which they could pass in a wheelchair. Even when this prac-
tice did not involve the task of passing under, it still resulted in improved estimation of 
this action boundary compared to estimations of perceivers who did not practice. No 
improvement across trials occurredwhich implies that learning occurred prior to the 
judgments when allowed to practice and no learning occurred after the beginning of 
the judgment sessions (Stoffregen et al. 2009). 
 A Remedy called Affordance 
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The Role Of Exploration And Movement In The Perception Of Affordances 
The previous results raised  the  question  of how the  participants  recalibrated  their 
perceptual boundaries. In order to get more insight into this process Mark et al. (1990) 
had participants judge their maximum seat height (with and without the 10 cm blocks, 
see Mark  1987) while being, more or less, restrained in visual and physical explora-
tion. When allowed to move (even just leaning forward and sideward and rotating 
their head) the observers were able to improve their estimations of maximum seat 
height. However,when exploration was constrained, less or even no recalibration oc-
curred. Exploration was needed both in the condition with blocks as well as in the 
normal standing condition in order for recalibration to occur. The results suggested 
that participants had to determine their action capabilities each time before perform-
ing an action, even if they were familiar with the task (Mark et al. 1990).  
The necessity of exploration (see for instance Mark 1990; Stoffregen 2009) implies that 
at least some movement is needed in order to pick up information about action capa-
bilities. Oudejans et al. (1996) investigated the role of movement in the perception of 
catchableness of fly balls. They had participants judge whether balls were catchable in 
two different conditions. In a “stand” condition participants were not allowed to move 
while making the judgment. In a “move” condition they were allowed to move for a 
short period of time before having to judge the catchability of the ball. Even experi-
enced baseball players had difficulties judging the catchability when not allowed to 
move during the task. The results demonstrated that movement was needed in order 
to perceive their action capabilities (Oudejans et al. 1996; but see Fajen et al. 2011). 
Additionally, Pepping and Li (2008) found that haptic exploration of the ground sur-
face influenced the perception of the action boundaries in a jump-and-reach task. Al-
though the perception of the action boundaries was not necessarily more accurate 
when the participants were allowed to haptically explore the surface (a constant over-
estimation of  different surfaces occurred), the judgments were more consistent and 
less variable than the judgments without the possibility to explore. 
 
Developmental Approaches To Affordances 
In the previous part we addressed the process of recalibration of perceptual bounda-
ries after changes in action capabilities. For example, in the studies of Mark (1987, 
1990) and Pepping and Li (1999, 2000, 2008) the participants faced temporary changes 
in  their  action  capabilities  resulting  from  external  factors  (e.g.  blocks  under  their 
shoes or increased mass of the participants). One of the more permanent changes in 
action capabilities is related to the process of growing older. Every day children have 
to adapt to changes in their action capabilities caused by development of skills and 
growth. Some of the classic studies on the development of visually guided locomotion 
in infants involved the detection of a visual cliff by infants. In these studies, infants 
balked at the edge of a visual cliff despite the presence of a Plexiglas table preventing 
them from actually falling (e.g., E. J. Gibson &Walk 1960, and Walk &E. J. Gibson 1961; 
for an overview of visual cliff studies, see, for instance, Adolph et al. 1993a and Adolph 
&Eppler 1998).  AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
 
59
 Multiple studies considered the perception of affordances of walking infants as well 
as crawling infants. E. J. Gibson et al. (1987) found a difference between walking and 
crawling infants in the perception of traversability of different surfaces. Walking in-
fants showed longer initiation times and more exploration (both visual and haptic) 
when facing a deformable surface as compared to a standard surface. Crawling in-
fants did not exhibit such differences. When given the choice between the surfaces, 
walking infants displayed a preference for the standard surface that afforded walking, 
whereas crawling infants did not exhibit a preference for one type of surface. This 
shows that infants detected the affordances for locomotion in a particular action mode 
(E. J. Gibson et al. 1987). The analogous conclusion can be drawn regarding infants’ 
behaviour on slopes. In a series of experiments, Adolph and colleagues studied how 
walking and crawling infants adapted their locomotion when facing slopes of varying 
steepness (e.g., Adolph 1995; Adolph et al. 1993b; Eppler et al. 1996). Walking infants 
walked down a shallow hill of 10 degrees but slid down or avoided a risky steep hill of 
36 degrees which are appropriate choices for the different degrees of the slant (Eppler 
et al. 1996; see also Adolph 1995). Also, Adolph’s (1997) longitudinal study of infants’ 
ability of crawling and walking on slopes showed that crawling infants gradually im-
proved their judgments of risky slopes until these were near perfect in their last week 
of crawling. Next, after the transition from crawling to walking, all infants displayed a 
sharp  decline  in  the  accuracy  of  their judgments  of  risky slopes,  after  which  their 
judgments improved again just as when they had been crawling. That is to say, infants 
became increasingly capable of adapting their mode of locomotion to the properties of 
the slant relative to their own locomotor proficiency, but this improved ability to judge 
slopes did not transfer from crawling to walking (Adolph 1997). Interestingly, when 
loading the infants with extra weight, infants changed their actions in accordance with 
this change in action capabilities by treating a slope that was a safe one in normal 
conditions as risky in the extra-weight conditions (Adolph and Avalio 2000).  
Other studies focused on the influence of walking experience on the action boundaries 
of  children.  In  a  barrier  crossing  task  (Schmuckler  1996)  and  a  gap  crossing  task 
(Zwart et al. 2005) walking experience was related to the observed thresholds for bar-
rier and gap crossing. Schmuckler (1996) suggested that skill and experience might 
play critical roles in tasks in which the actor is not an expert and that factors such as 
body size might become more important in familiar, well-practiced tasks. 
Whereas many affordance studies have been performed on infants and toddlers as 
well as on adults, only few studies have looked at the developmental changes between 
infancy  and  adulthood.  Plumert  (1995)  compared  6  and  8-year-old  children  with 
adults, and demonstrated differences in the accuracy between adults’ and children’s 
judgments  whether  they  could  perform  different  tasks  (e.g.  reaching  and  stepping 
tasks). Whereas adults overestimated their ability if it was just beyond their action 
capabilities, children also overestimated situations that were well beyond their abili-
ties. Allowing the children to practice yielded improvements in the perception of the 
conditions that were well beyond their abilities for the 8-years-old, but not for the 6-
years-old. Furthermore, 6-year-olds with less accurate judgments of their action capa-
bilities had experienced more serious accidental injuries in their daily life (Plumert 
1995).  A Remedy called Affordance 
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The State Of The Actor In Relation To Perceiving Affordances 
In the previous parts of this review, studies investigating different factors influencing 
action capabilities have been discussed. In their daily life, people also have to readapt 
to, often subtle, internal changes caused by, for example, fatigue or injury. Pijpers et 
al. (2007) studied the influence of fatigue on the perception of action possibilities for 
climbing on a climbing wall. Their results showed that in case the exertion led to a 
change in the actual action capabilities, perceived maximal reaching height changed 
accordingly. When the perceived exertion was less, however, no changes in the actual 
action capabilities occurred, and in that case the perceived maximal reach did not 
change. This indicated that people do not base their estimates of the action capabilities 
on the perception of fatigue per se, but on their actual action capabilities (Pijpers et al. 
2007).  
Emotions are another example of a change in the internal state of the actor. Bootsma 
et  al.  (1992)  studied  the  effects  of anxiety  on  the  perception  of reachability  of  ap-
proaching balls. Anxiety did not influence the perception of the affordance itself. That 
is, the location of the action boundary for reaching remained the same. This was in 
line with the expectations, since anxiety did not affect the action capabilities of the 
participants, the judgments should not be altered. However, as expected by the au-
thors, more variability in the perception of the action capability occurred. The conclu-
sion of the authors was that anxiety did lead to decreased accuracy in the pickup of 
the information that specifies the affordance of reachability of passing balls (Bootsma 
et al. 1992). The notion that anxiety can change action capabilities in some situations 
was shown by Pijpers et al. (2006), who investigated whether actual changes in the 
action capabilities of climbers induced by anxiety would lead to an adaptation of their 
judgments of their maximal reach in a climbing task. Indeed, the decrease in actual 
maximal reach in the high-anxiety condition did result in lower perceived maximal 
reaches. Subsequently, Pijpers et al. investigated whether the anxiety would also lead 
to differences in realizing the action possibilities. Participants did select other actions 
in the high-anxiety condition, but other factors than the perceived change in action 
capabilities might have contributed. Another experiment in the same study revealed 
that narrowing of attention caused by the anxiety might have played a role as well 
(Pijpers et al. 2006).  
 
Social Affordances 
Not only the perception of affordances for oneself, but more recently also the percep-
tion of affordances for others have become a point of interest. In daily life, people en-
counter plenty of situations that require interaction with other people. In some situa-
tions one even has to anticipate  actions of others and, thus, on the action capabilities 
of others. Young children (three-to-five-years old) are already sensitive to the percep-
tion  of  action  capabilities  of  others  in  the  task  of  reaching  (Rochat  1995).  Rochat 
showed that children correctly judged the maximal reaching distance of an adult to be 
greater than their own maximal reaching distance. Whereas Rochat did not frame his AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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study in terms of action capabilities per se, Stoffregen et al. (1999) did. They consid-
ered intrinsic scales for the observed person as well as for the observer in the judg-
ment of maximal and optimal sitting height of small and tall people. Observers in Stof-
fregen et al.’s study were able to base their judgments on the action capabilities of the 
different persons rather than on their own action capabilities. This implies that people 
are not only able to differentiate between the action capabilities of another person 
and themselves, but can also judge the difference in action capabilities between dif-
ferent persons (see also Mark 2007, for other examples).  
As discussed before, the ability to recalibrate after a change in action capabilities is an 
important factor in the perception of affordances for oneself. In the case of the percep-
tion of affordances for others, the question is whether observers are able to recali-
brate  to  the  information  specifying  changed  action  capabilities.  Ramenzoni  et  al. 
(2008) had people perform a reach-with-jump task to investigate recalibration in the 
perception of the action capabilities of other persons. The action capabilities of the 
observed person were changed by attaching weights around the ankles, which was 
either visually apparent for the observer or hidden underneath the person’s clothes. 
Even when observers were not explicitly aware of the extra weight attached around 
the ankles of the person, they gave lower estimates of the maximal reach-with-jump as 
compared to the situation without the extra weight. Ramenzoni et al.’s results demon-
strated that people are sensitive to a change in the action capabilities of others. This is 
impressive considering the fact that the observers did not actually see the person per-
form the reach-with-jump task, but only saw the person walking around. 
In order to accurately judge affordances for others it matters what action the observer 
sees the person performing. Ramenzoni and colleagues (2010) compared the situation 
in which the person rotated the torso with the situation in which the person lifted a 
weight by squatting. The latter is an action related to the action of jumping whereas 
the former is not. Observing the person performing the nonrelated action did not yield 
an improvement in the perception of the action capabilities of the person; in contrast, 
observing the person performing the action related to the task to be judged did help to 
improve judgments. 
Expertise might also play a role in the proficiency to judge affordances for others. 
Weast et al. (2011) addressed this issue by looking at the difference between basketball 
players  and  non-basketball  players  in  the  perception  of  sport-relevant  (maximum 
standing-reach  and  reach-with-jump  heights)  and  non-sport-relevant  affordances 
(maximum sitting height). Basketball players were more accurate in the perception of 
the maximal jump and reach of others than the non-basketball players. Furthermore, 
they showed improvement in their judgments of the maximal jump and reach after 
exposure to kinematic information, whereas non-basketball players did not. Weast et 
al. suggested that this might be due to a greater sensitivity of basketball players to ki-
nematic information reflecting the action capabilities of others. 
Until now, we discussed studies on the perception of affordances for others, in which 
no interaction between the observers and observed people took place. Recently, also 
the affordances for joint action have become a point of the interest for study. For in-
stance, the participants in the study of Richardson et al. (2007) judged whether they A Remedy called Affordance 
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would grasp planks of wood using one hand, two hands or together with another per-
son. When comparing these judgments with actual performance, one-handed grasp-
ing,  two-handed  grasping,  or  two-person  grasping  could  be  mapped  onto  relevant 
body dimensions (i.e., the size of hands and arms). When scaling plank length, ob-
served patterns in the transitions between using one or two hands were similar to 
observed patterns in the transitions between using two hands or two persons, at simi-
lar action-scaled ratios. These results show that people are not only able to perceive 
intrapersonal affordances but they are also capable of perceiving interpersonal affor-
dances in grasping. Similarly, Davis et al. (2010) investigated the action boundaries of 
dyads walking through an aperture. For both dyads in which the observer took part as 
well  as  for  dyads  consisting  of  two  other  persons  the  observer’s  perceived  action 
boundary for the dyad was smaller than the sum of the individual action boundaries. 
This indicates that observers were sensitive to the affordance for joint action, rather 
than just mentally adding the individual action boundaries.  
 
An Alternative Approach To Affordances 
The affordances research reviewed until here followed the approach as first intro-
duced by Warren (1984,1988). At about the same time that this line of research origi-
nated, another approach, forwarded by Michaels (1988), combined the theory of affor-
dances with work on stimulus-response compatibility in choice reaction times. Stimu-
lus-response (s-r) compatibility refers to the degree to which a set of stimuli and asso-
ciated responses are naturally related to each other. Michaels (1988) explored the rela-
tionship between s-r compatibility phenomena and the theory of affordances. Stimu-
lus-response  compatibility  occurs  when  responses  are  faster  for  particular  stimuli 
than for other stimuli. A well-known example is spatial s-r compatibility which is ob-
served when the spatial arrangements of stimuli are responded to faster by certain 
spatial arrangements of responses (Fitts& Seeger 1953;or an overview of the ecological 
approach to s-r compatibility, see Michaels &Stins 1997). Michaels hypothesized that 
the detection of affordances might be manifested in the speed by which responses are 
made, thus “responses afforded in certain situations ought to be faster than responses 
not afforded” (Michaels 1988:  231-232). To test this hypothesis, a series of experiments 
was conducted which tested whether or not an object moving toward one hand would 
lead to faster responses with that hand than with the other hand, even though it might 
be closer to the other hand and,thus, have positional compatibility. The results re-
vealed that participants reacted faster with the hand that could more easily intercept 
the object, providing support for the idea that spatial compatibility effects reflect the 
perception of possibilities for action. In a number of experiments, Stins and Michaels 
(1997, 2000) extended the approach by investigating the differences among response 
modes varying in level of compatibility. Different compatibility effects were found for 
the  different  response  modes  (pressing  a  button  versus  using  a  joystick:  Stins& 
Michaels 1997; actual reaches versus button pressing: Stins& Michaels 2000). 
Response times have been taken in account by other researchers as well. Fitzpatrick et 
al.  (1994)  had  participants  judge  whether  slants  afford  standing,  and  found an  in-
crease in response times and a decrease in confidence about the judgments the closer AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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to the action boundary. These results, together with the approach of Michaels (1988), 
led  Smith  and  Pepping  (2010)  to  consider  movement  initiation  times,  rather  than 
judgment response times. They studied a reaching task, involving posting small balls 
through  apertures  of  varying  size  and  showed  that  judgment  response  times  and 
reaching movement times were longer and more variable when approaching the ac-
tion boundary. Since initiation time appeared to be highly sensitive to the location of 
the action boundary and optimal regions, Smith and Pepping argued that it offers a 
metric of affordance perception.  
In most studies on affordances the perceived action boundaries are compared with the 
actual action boundaries. Pepping and Li (2005) hypothesized that the often-observed 
systematic errors between perceived and exact actual action capabilities might have 
been related to the means by which perceptual performance is measured. Therefore, 
in their study, both verbal as actual actions were used as response measures for judg-
ment of overhead reachability. The results suggest that a perceptual judgment task is 
different than actually acting on affordances (Pepping & Li 2005). 
 
Concluding Remarks: The Future 
In this review we gave an overview of the affordance research in the past and in the  
present. The concept of affordances was introduced by J. J. Gibson, and most clearly so 
in his 1979 book entitled ‘The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception’ (1986/1979). 
Although research on affordances predates J.J. Gibson’s conceptual work and can even 
be traced back to the seminal work of his wife E.J. Gibson (see E.J. Gibson 2002), the 
most influential empirical work on affordances can be traced to the pioneering work 
of Warren (1984, 1988) and Michaels (1988) Since then, the methods and approaches 
proposed by these studies have served as a guide to discovery. They have inspired 
many researchers to generate experiments in a variety of tasks, which resulted in a 
great amount of knowledge on different aspects of affordances. Most of the studies 
have continued to approach the study of affordances with similar methods -- that is, 
using discretely defined actions, and focusing on pi-numbers and action boundaries -- 
as first demonstrated in the classical studies on affordances (e.g. Warren 1984; Warren 
&Whang 1987; Mark 1987). Examples are the results of studies emphasizing the dy-
namic nature of affordances and those examining the ideas of recalibration, and per-
ception of social affordances. The majority of studies focus on action boundaries. That 
is to say, they have aimed to establish whether some action is possible or not and 
whether participants are able to perceive this.  
In this review we focused on what Warren called ‘the affordance problem’ and we can 
conclude that most of the studies on affordances have followed a more or less tradi-
tional approach, using and extending the paradigms as first introduced by Warren 
(1984, 1988) which mainly focused on the perception of action boundaries. This focus 
on action boundaries leads to the impression that the primary behavioural utility for 
affordances is for the selection of behaviour, rather than the continuous control of 
action (for similar arguments see also Stoffregen 2000 and Smith 2009). This poses and 
important challenge to affordance research as results so far seem to emphasize a di-A Remedy called Affordance 
 
64
chotomous view of possible and impossible actions which, obviously, is not sufficient 
to explain human behaviour. Given this shortcoming, what should the future of affor-
dance research hold? 
An answer to this question can possibly be found in the paper that was so instrumen-
tal in providing the methodological tools for most of the affordance research reported 
here. In his seminal 1988 paper Warren proposed that affordances have to be selected 
and that subsequently the mode of action and the laws of controls are selected. Fur-
thermore, Warren argued that the affordance problem is directly tied to the ‘control 
problem’ (Warren, 1988). A study on the control problem would focus on the laws of 
control by which our actions are being controlled. (i.e., ‘information-based control’). 
From an information-based perspective the role of perception is to detect information 
in the ambient flow fields (e.g., in the optic flow) that can be used to guide movement 
according to a law of control (e.g., see Fajen 2007a). Examples of this information in 
the optic flow are the optical variable tau that specifies time-to-contact, and tau-dot 
(e.g., see Lee 1976, 1980)and optical acceleration for catching fly balls (e.g., see Chap-
man 1968; Michaels &Oudejans 1992; Todd 1981; Zaal& Michaels 2003). Historically 
Warren can be seen to have marked the start of separate research traditions into ei-
ther the control problem or the affordance problem. 
Research that links the affordance problem and the control problem as defined by 
Warren  (1988)  is  scant. A  noticeable  exception  is  Fajen’s (2005,  2007a)  affordance-
based control approach that sets out to show how action-capabilities play a role in the 
control of action. For instance, in the control of braking, Fajen (2007a) argued that 
people are sensitive to their action boundaries. This sensitivity is not captured in the 
typical information-based control explanation of keeping tau dot at a required value 
(e.g., see Yilmaz & Warren 1995). People are not simply using a control that can be 
framed in terms of (not) braking hard enough to avoid a collision, but people’s control 
also takes into account their action. In other words, Fajen argues that the existing in-
formation-based approach fails to capture the limits of people’s action capabilities. For 
example, the tau-dot model assumes that there are no limits to the amount of decelera-
tion, but in real life actions these limits always exist (Fajen 2007a, for other examples 
on affordance based control see e.g. Fajen 2008, 2007b; Fajen&Devaney 2006, Bastin et 
al. 2010). 
Fajen’s work on affordance-based control seems a promising start to the unification of 
the affordance problem and the control problem. Note though, that also in affordance-
based control the focus remains on the execution of discrete actions and on distin-
guishing possible and impossible actions when performing one specific task. Although 
the theory of affordance based control nicely shows the role affordances might play in 
the control of action, it remains relatively silent on the role of control in the percep-
tion of affordances. What is more, since its focus is on control, the research on affor-
dances based control does not yet provide us with insight into how the affordance 
problem is solved; that is, as defined by Warren (1988), how an actor selects an affor-
dance to be realized. 
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In summary, after J.J. Gibson’s conceptualisation, Warren (1984, 1988) and Michaels 
(1988) have been instrumental in shaping the research on affordances. Reviewing the 
empirical literature, we conclude that research on affordances thus far seems to em-
phasise perception of action-boundaries in discrete actions which has prevented re-
searchers from taking into account other aspects of affordances, most notably the link 
between affordances and the control of action. Warren’s conceptualisation of the af-
fordance problem and the control problem (Warren, 1988) has thus far not invited 
much research that looks at affordances and control in an integrated manner, with a 
notable exception of Fajen’s research on affordance based control. Historically, we feel 
that Warren (1988) marks both the start as well as the future of research on affor-
dances and that integrative study of affordances and control of action deserves to be 
put high on the future research agenda of Ecological Psychology. 
 
References  
Adolph, K. E. 1995. Psychophysical assessment of toddlers' ability to cope with slopes. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 21(4): 734-750.  
Adolph, K. E. 1997. Learning in the development of infant locomotion. Monographs of the Society 
for Research in Child Development, 62(3, Serial No. 251). 
Adolph, K. E., & Avolio, A. M. 2000. Walking infants adapt locomotion to changing body dimen-
sions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 26(3): 1148-1166.  
Adolph, K. E., & Eppler, M. A. 1998. Development of visually guided locomotion. Ecological Psy-
chology, 10(3): 303-321. 
Adolph, K. E., Eppler, M. A., & Gibson, E. J. 1993a. Development of perception of affordances. 
Advances in Infancy Research, 8: 51-98. 
Adolph, K. E., Eppler, M. A., & Gibson, E. J. 1993b. Crawling versus walking infants' perception of 
affordances for locomotion over sloping surfaces. Child Development, 64(4): 1158-1174. 
Bastin J., Montagne G., & Fajen B.R. 2010. Controlling speed and direction during interception: 
An affordance-based approach. Experimental Brain Research, 201(4): 763-780. 
Bootsma, R. J., Bakker, F. C., Van Snippenberg, F., & Tdlohreg, C. W. 1992. The effects of anxiety 
on perceiving the reachability of passing objects. Ecological Psychology, 4(1): 1-16. 
Carello, C., Grosofsky, A., Reichel, F. D., Solomon, H. Y., & Turvey, M. 1989. Visually perceiving 
what is reachable. Ecological Psychology, 1(1): 27-54. 
Chapman, S. 1968. Catching a baseball. American Journal of Physics, 36(10): 868-870. 
Chemero, A. 2003. An outline of a theory of affordances. Ecological Psychology, 15(2): 181-195. 
Davis, T. J., Riley, M. A., Shockley, K., & Cummins-Sebree, S. 2010. Perceiving affordances for 
joint actions. Perception, 39(12): 1624-1644. 
Eppler, M. A., Adolph, K. E., & Weiner, T. 1996. The developmental relationship between infant's 
exploration and action on slanted surfaces. Infant Behavior & Development, 19(2): 259-264. 
Fajen, B. R., & Devaney, M. C. 2006. Learning to control collisions: The role of perceptual at-
tunement  and  action  boundaries. Journal  of  Experimental Psychology:  Human Perception and 
Performance, 32(2): 300-313. A Remedy called Affordance 
 
66
Fajen, B. R., Diaz, G., & Cramer, C. 2011. Reconsidering the role of movement in perceiving ac-
tion-scaled affordances. Human Movement Science, 30(3): 504-533. 
Fajen, B. R. 2005. Perceiving possibilities for action: On the necessity of calibration and percep-
tual learning for the visual guidance of action. Perception, 34(6): 717-740. 
Fajen, B. R. 2007a. Affordance-Based Control of Visually Guided Action. Ecological Psychology, 
19(4): 383-410. 
Fajen, B. R. 2007b. Rapid recalibration based on optic flow in visually guided action. Experimen-
tal Brain Research, 183(1): 61-74. 
Fajen, B. R. 2008. Perceptual learning and the visual control of braking. Attention, Perception, & 
Psychophysics, 70(6): 1117-1129. 
Fitts, P. M., & Seeger, C. M. 1953. S-R compatibility: Spatial characteristics of stimulus and re-
sponse codes. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 46: 199-210. 
Fitzpatrick, P., Carello, C., Schmidt, R., & Corey, D. 1994. Haptic and visual perception of an af-
fordance for upright posture. Ecological Psychology, 6(4): 265-287. 
Gibson, E. J., Riccio, G., Schmuckler, M. A., Stoffregen, T. A., Rosenberg, D., & Taormina, J. 1987. 
Detection of the traversability of surfaces by crawling and walking infants. Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 13(4): 533.  
Gibson, E. J., & Walk, R. D. 1960. The "visual cliff". Scientific American, 202(4): 64-71. 
Gibson, E. J. 2002. Perceiving the Affordances: A Portrait of Two Psychologists. Hillsdale, NJ: Law-
rence Erlbaum Associates. 
Gibson, J.J. 1966. The senses considered as perceptual systems. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. 
Gibson, J.J. 1977. The theory of affordances. In R.E. Shaw & J. Bransford (Eds.), Perceiving, Acting 
and Knowing: Toward an ecological psychology:. 67-82. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associ-
ates. 
Gibson, J.J. 1979/1986. The Theory of Affordances. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception: 
127-143. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  
Higuchi, T., Takada, H., Matsuura, Y., & Imanaka, K. 2004. Visual Estimation of Spatial Require-
ments for Locomotion in Novice Wheelchair Users. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 
10(1): 55-66.  
Jiang, Y., & Mark, L. S. 1994. The effect of gap depth on the perception of whether a gap is cross-
able. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 56(6): 691-700.  
Kinsella-Shaw, J. M., Shaw, B., & Turvey, M. T. 1992. Perceiving 'Walk-on-able' Slopes. Ecological 
Psychology, 4(4): 223-239. 
Konczak, J., Meeuwsen, H. J., & Cress, M. E. 1992. Changing affordances in stair climbing: The 
perception of maximum climbability in young and older adults. Journal of Experimental Psy-
chology: Human Perception and Performance, 18(3): 691-697.  
Lee,  D.  N.  1976.  A  theory  of  visual  control  of  braking  based  on  information  about  time-to-
collision. Perception, 5(4): 437-459. 
Lee, D. N., & Kalmus, H. 1980. The Optic Flow Field: The Foundation of Vision [and Discussion]. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. B, Biological Sciences, 290(1038): 169-
178. AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
 
67
Malek, E. A., & Wagman, J. B. 2008. Kinetic potential influences visual and remote haptic percep-
tion of affordances for standing on an inclined surface. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 61(12): 1813-1826. 
Mark, L. S. 1987. Eyeheight-scaled information about affordances: A study of sitting and stair 
climbing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 13(3): 361-
370.  
Mark, L. S. 2007. Perceiving the actions of other people. Ecological Psychology, 19(2): 107-136. 
Mark, L. S., Balliett, J. A., Craver, K. D., Douglas, S. D., & Fox, T. (1990). What an actor must do in 
order to perceive the affordance for sitting. Ecological Psychology, 2(4): 325-366. 
Michaels, C. F. 1988. SR compatibility between response position and destination of apparent 
motion: Evidence of the detection of affordances. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 14(2): 231-240.  
Michaels,  C.  F.,  &  Stins,  J.  F.  1997.  An  ecological  approach  to  stimulus-response  compatibil-
ity. Advances in Psychology, 118: 333-360. 
Michaels, C. F. 2003. Affordances: Four points of debate. Ecological Psychology, 15(2): 135-148. 
Michaels, C. F.& Oudejans, R. R. D. 1992. The optics and actions of catching fly balls: zeroing out 
optical acceleration. Ecological psychology, 4(4): 199-222. 
Oudejans, R. R. D., Michaels, C. F., Bakker, F. C., & Dolné, M. A. 1996. The relevance of action in 
perceiving affordances: Perception of catchableness of fly balls. Journal of Experimental Psy-
chology: Human Perception and Performance, 22(4): 879-891.  
Pepping GJ, & Li FX. 2005. Effects of response task on reaction time and the detection of affor-
dances. Motor Control, 9(2): 129-143.  
Pepping GJ, & Li FX. 2008. The role of haptic exploration of ground surface information in per-
ception of overhead reachability. Journal of Motor Behavior, 40(6): 491-498. 
Pepping, G. J., & Li, F. X. 1997. Perceiving action boundaries in the volleyball block. Studies in 
Perception and Action IV: 137-140.  
Pepping, G. J., & Li, F. X. 1999. Changing Action Capabilities For Jumping. Tenth International 
Conference on Perception and Action: August 8-13, 1999, Edinburgh, Scotland: 203.  
Pepping, G., & Li, F. 2000. Changing action capabilities and the perception of affordances. Jour-
nal of Human Movement Studies, 39(2): 115-140. 
Pijpers, J., Oudejans, R. R. D., & Bakker, F. C. 2007. Changes in the perception of action possibili-
ties while climbing to fatigue on a climbing wall. Journal of Sports Sciences, 25(1): 97-110. 
Pijpers, J., Oudejans, R. R. D., Bakker, F. C., & Beek, P. J. 2006. The role of anxiety in perceiving 
and realizing affordances. Ecological Psychology, 18(3): 131-161. 
Plumert, J. M. 1995. Relations between children's overestimation of their physical abilities and 
accident proneness. Developmental Psychology, 31(5): 866-876. 
Pufall, P. B., & Dunbar, C. 1992. Perceiving whether or not the world affords stepping onto and 
over: A developmental study. Ecological Psychology, 4: 17-38. 
Ramenzoni V.C., Davis T.J., Riley M.A., & Shockley K. 2010. Perceiving action boundaries: Learn-
ing effects in perceiving maximum jumping-reach affordances. Attention, Perception, and Psy-
chophysics, 72(4): 1110-1119.  A Remedy called Affordance 
 
68
Ramenzoni, V., Riley, M. A., Davis, T., Shockley, K., & Armstrong, R. 2008. Tuning in to another 
person's action capabilities: Perceiving maximal jumping-reach height from walking kinematics. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 34(4): 919-928.  
Reed, E. S. 1996. Encountering the world: Toward an Ecological Psychology. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Regia-Corte, T., & Wagman, J. B. 2008. Perception of affordances for standing on an inclined 
surface depends on height of center of mass. Experimental Brain Research, 191(1): 25-35. 
Richardson, M. J., Marsh, K. L., & Baron, R. M. 2007. Judging and actualizing intrapersonal and 
interpersonal affordances. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Perform-
ance, 33(4): 845-859.  
Rochat, P. 1995. Perceived reachability for self and for others by 3-to 5-year-old children and 
adults. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 59(2): 317-333. 
Schmuckler, M. A. 1996. Development of visually guided locomotion: Barrier crossing by tod-
dlers. Ecological Psychology, 8(3): 209-236. 
Smith, J. 2009. The Emergence and Perceptual Guidance of Prehensile Action (Doctoral thesis Uni-
versity  of  Edinburgh,  Edinburgh,  United  Kingdom).  Retrieved  from:  http://lac-repo-
live7.is.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/4255 
Smith J., & Pepping G.-J. 2010. Effects of affordance perception on the initiation and actualiza-
tion of action. Ecological Psychology, 22(2): 119-149. 
Stefanucci, J. K., &Geuss, M. N. 2010. Duck! Scaling the height of a horizontal barrier to body 
height. Attention, Perception & Psychophysics, 72(5): 1338-1349.  
Stins,  J.  F.,  &  Michaels,  C.  F.  1997.  Stimulus-response  compatibility  is  information-action 
compatibility. Ecological Psychology, 9(1): 25-45. 
Stins, J. F., & Michaels, C. F. 2000. Stimulus-response compatibility for absolute and relative spa-
tial correspondence in reaching and in button pressing. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology Section A, 53(2): 569-589. 
Stoffregen, T. A. 2000. Affordances and events. Ecological Psychology, 12(1): 1-28. 
Stoffregen, T. A. 2003. Affordances as properties of the animal-environment system. Ecological 
Psychology, 15(2): 115-134. 
Stoffregen, T. A., Gorday, K. M., Sheng, Y. Y., & Flynn, S. B. 1999. Perceiving affordances for an-
other person's actions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 
25(1): 120-136.  
Stoffregen, T. A., Yang, C. M., Giveans, M. R., Flanagan, M., & Bardy, B. G. 2009. Movement in the 
Perception of an Affordance for Wheelchair Locomotion. Ecological Psychology, 21(1): 1-36. 
Todd, J. T. 1981. Visual information about moving objects. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception & Performance, 7(4): 795-810. 
Turvey, M. 1992. Affordances and prospective control: An outline of the ontology. Ecological 
Psychology, 4(3): 173-187. 
van der Meer, A. L. H. 1997. Visual guidance of passing under a barrier. Early Development and 
Parenting, 6(34): 149-158.  
Wagman, J. B., & Malek, E. A. 2008. Perception of affordances for walking under a barrier from 
proximal and distal points of observation. Ecological Psychology, 20(1): 65-83. AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
 
69
Wagman, J. B., & Malek, E. A. 2009. Geometric, kinetic-kinematic, and intentional constraints 
influence willingness to pass under a barrier. Experimental Psychology, 56(6): 409-417. 
Walk, R. D., & Gibson, E. J. 1961. A comparative and analytical study of visual depth perception. 
Psychological Monographs, 75 (Serial No. 519)  
Warren, W. H. 1984. Perceiving affordances: Visual guidance of stair climbing. Journal of Ex-
perimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 10(5): 683-703.  
Warren, W. H. 1988. Action modes and laws of control for the visual guidance of action. Ad-
vances in Psychology, 50: 339-379. 
Warren, W. H., & Whang, S. 1987. Visual guidance of walking through apertures: Body-scaled 
information for affordances. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Per-
formance, 13(3): 371-383.  
Weast J.A., Shockley K., & Riley M.A. 2011. The influence of athletic experience and kinematic 
information on skill-relevant affordance perception. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychol-
ogy, 64(4): 689-706. 
Yilmaz, E. H., & Warren, W. H. 1995. Visual control of braking: A test of the ṫ hypothesis. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 21(5): 996. 
Zaal, F. T. J. M., & Michaels, C. F. 2003. The information for catching fly balls: Judging and inter-
cepting virtual balls in a CAVE. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Per-
formance, 29(3): 537-555.  
Zwart, R., Ledebt, A., Fong, B. F., de Vries, H., & Savelsbergh, G. J. P. 2005. The affordance of gap 
crossing in toddlers. Infant Behavior and Development, 28(2): 145-154.  
 